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Abstract: China is now Brazil‘s largest trade and investment partner, with Brazil‘s exports 
dominated by primary products such as iron ore, soy and crude oil. China and Brazil have also 
become major players in international environmental debates as emerging powers, reflecting 
their contribution to carbon emissions and their vulnerability to climate change and 
environmental disasters such as droughts, floods, deforestation, landslides and pollution. In 
environmental terms, Brazil‘s exports to China have led to changes in land use focused on 
export agriculture, the construction of infrastructure in vulnerable areas such as the Amazon 
region and a growing need for cheap, renewable energy to fuel transport, consumption and 
industrial development. In the context of these intensifying trade and economic connections 
between Brazil and China, this article examines the environmental dimensions of this 
relationship, focusing in particular on the contradictions created by renewable energy 
production. Paradoxically, given Brazil‘s key role in the international climate change debate, 
one of the most controversial aspects of the country‘s development agenda is the promotion of 
renewable energy as evidenced in the conflicts around hydro-electric power generation. The 
latter have provoked protests against the dams‘ social and environmental effects among local 
communities and international environmental groups. Little studied compared to the more 
well-known aspects of Sino-Latin American relations, such as infrastructure and trade, the 
article argues that Chinese involvement in hydropower in Brazil reinforces an increasingly 
unsustainable domestic development agenda, as reflected in the asymmetry between 
arguments about the general benefits of hydropower and the negative effects on local 
communities.  
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Introduction 
In 2014, the Federal Republic of Brazil and the People‘s Republic of China celebrated the 40th 
anniversary of their diplomatic relations. Despite the distance, cooperation between China and 
Brazil has grown remarkably closer since the two countries first established diplomatic ties in 
1974. President Jiang Zemin‘s visit to Brazil in November 1993 and the subsequent creation 
of a formal strategic partnership marked a milestone in Sino-Brazilian relations. Since the end 
of the Cold War, building strategic partnerships has been a key dimension of Chinese 
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diplomacy. While China‘s strategic partnerships were originally limited to Brazil, Russia and 
the United States in the 1990s, this policy has now expanded considerably (Zhongping and 
Jing, 2014). Despite this, China‘s relationship with Brazil remains of great importance; since 
2003 and under the leadership of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers‘ Party, PT) 
government, Sino-Brazilian relations have intensified and deepened, developing into a fully-
fledged strategic partnership. As Haibin notes,  
 
Both countries share the identity of major developing states, leading regional 
players, and big potential roles in world affairs. Based on these common identities 
and forward-looking thinking, both countries developed a comprehensive 
cooperative path (2010: 185).  
 
In economic terms, from 2009 onwards Chinese demand for Brazilian exports has increased 
dramatically, reaching US$30 billion in 2010 (Fearnside and Figueiredo, 2015: 9). 
Furthermore, China has become Brazil‘s largest trading partner with trade dominated by 
primary products such as iron ore, soy products and crude oil, surpassing both the United 
States and the European Union (Haibin, 2010). Until the late 2010s, Chinese demand for 
natural resources pushed up the price of commodities to record-high levels that greatly 
benefitted the Brazilian economy. Within the context of intensifying economic and political 
relations between Brazil and China, this article examines the environmental dimensions of 
this relationship, while one arena in which Brazil and China have begun to deepen their 
comprehensive strategic partnership is in climate change and renewable energy production. 
While Sino-Latin American relations offer opportunities for increased political 
cooperation and coordination and economic, technical and scientific collaboration, they also 
pose a number of complex challenges, including the social and environmental impacts of 
Chinese trade and investment patterns. As Ignacio Frechero notes, ―a key point in the 
contemporary China-Latin America relations is to analyse both the opportunities and 
challenges that this rising power entails to the region‖ (2012: 141). As economic ties between 
Brazil and China have strengthened they have also become increasingly asymmetric given 
that Brazil‘s exports to China have consisted primarily of natural resources and agricultural 
products. Chinese investments have also become essential for environmentally and socially 
sensitive sectors such as hydroelectric power generation. China‘s strong demand for natural 
resources and energy is therefore changing the landscape of Latin American territories, 
threatening ecosystems and the sovereignty of local communities over their natural resources 
and land. These problems suggest that Chinese investment may not offer a legitimate 
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alternative to the extractivist model of development currently in place but rather reinforces the 
problems associated with reliance on the primary sector (Ibid., 2012: 147). The conflicts 
regarding renewable energy in Brazil illustrate that ‗energy resources can promote as well as 
limit sustainable and substantive development‘ (Logan and McNeish, 2015: 291-2) while 
existing inequalities reinforce the positive and negative effects of natural resource 
exploitation.  
This article analyses the environmental dimensions of Sino-Brazilian relations, arguing 
that the asymmetrical economic relationship between China and Brazil has reinforced the 
unsustainable nature of Brazil‘s natural resources boom. As part of a strategy known as neo-
extractivism, many Latin American countries have come to rely on natural resources exports, 
particularly under progressive governments, often justified by the argument that the export 
revenues will finance social development. As the first section argues, despite the promise of 
high revenues, the neo-extractivist model is mired with social, environmental and political 
contradictions. This article contributes to the debate on the neo-extractivist model‘s 
sustainability by demonstrating that this debate should no longer be limited to traditional 
extractivist activities such as mining and oil production. Paradoxically, in the case of 
hydropower renewable energy production is based on water as a renewable source but 
simultaneously leads to irreversible damage to local communities and Amazonia as one of the 
world‘s most significant natural environments. Secondly, in spite of their asymmetric 
relationship, Brazil and China as major developing powers have developed shared interests in 
international climate change policy, energy and mitigation through investments in renewable 
energy, resulting in increasing levels of Chinese investment in the sector, despite the 
economic downturn. Thirdly, while hydro-electric power is at the centre of both countries‘ 
energy agenda, the conflicts surrounding the construction of hydro-electric dams underline the 
contradictions between the search for sustainable energy sources, economic development and 
the rights of affected communities, reflecting the contradictions of neo-extractivism elsewhere 
in the region. Although China‘s economic relationship with Latin America has not caused 
these problems, the article concludes that the intensifying economic relationship between 
China and Brazil has reinforced the existing contradictions, as evident in the uneven 
distribution of the negative and positive effects of hydropower‘s expansion in Brazil‘s 
Amazon region. 
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Neo-Extractivism and Its Social-Environmental Contradictions  
The rise of China as a major player in the global capitalist economy has provided new 
opportunities for economic development and capitalist expansion through its continuous 
search for new market frontiers and commodities. High demand for natural resources among 
both industrialised and newly-industrialised countries has allowed natural resource 
exploitation to become both politically acceptable and a legitimate development strategy 
implemented over alternative concepts of development (O‘Toole, 2014). China‘s economic 
diplomacy channels have opened up direct access to much needed natural resources essential 
for it to sustain its economic growth and achieve its goal of modernisation. As an important 
source of raw materials, food and natural resources, China has increasingly focused its 
attention on Latin America as it seeks to replace non-renewable resources that have already 
been depleted within its own borders. However, sustained economic growth, particularly 
within the areas of natural resource development, has inevitably created environmental 
pressures, as the Brazilian case illustrates.  
Recognised as a highly bio-diverse country, Brazil contains ecological zones of both 
regional and global importance such as the Atlantic and Amazon rainforests, and the Pantanal 
tropical wetlands. On both a national and global level, Brazil like many other countries in 
Latin America, faces the challenge of reconciling development with sustainability. But 
Brazil‘s natural heritage is under serious threat from oil and gas extraction, mining, logging, 
soy production and expanding infrastructure such as hydroelectric dams. While natural 
resources offer an opportunity for economic growth and development, historically their 
presence has been a source of conflicting political, social and economic dynamics for Latin 
America (McNeish and Borchgrevink, 2015: 2). For most of the twentieth century, 
development based on extraction was blamed for widespread poverty, recurrent economic 
crises and political instability as well as environmental problems. As Schmink and Jouve-
Martín explain, 
 
Latin America‘s historical dependency on natural resources, both for local 
livelihoods and to supply an evolving global market, has made environmental 
issues central in policy debates and in widespread contests over the meaning and 
use of natural species and habitats, carried out against the region‘s persistent 
legacy of inequality (2011: 3).  
 
Although the resource-dependent development path has gained momentum in the last decade, 
debates on the developmental, social and ecological implications of the intensification of 
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extractivist activities have continued in Brazil as well as the rest of the continent (Buchardt 
and Dietz, 2014). Throughout its history, the region has experienced widespread contestations 
over the distribution, access to and control over natural resources as social-environmental 
concerns have been subordinated to economic growth.  
 
Following several decades of hyper-inflation and stagnation, the Brazilian economy turned a 
critical corner at the end of the twentieth century, beginning a new cycle of economic growth. 
Between 1994 and 1998, Brazilian governments introduced a stabilisation policy based on 
economic openness and privatisation, resuming its search for a new pattern of development. 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Brazil has pursued a development strategy 
aimed at strengthening its global commercial insertion through the export of primary 
commodities (Saad-Filho, 2012: 134). Its economic success during this period was based on 
the primarisation and the diversification of its exports, including industrialised agriculture and 
the exploitation of natural resources, supported by a favourable global markets as well as the 
government‘s proactive pursuit of greater autonomy though a more active state role in the 
economy. Although originally initiated by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments 
(1995-2002), it was under president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2009) that the policy of 
South-South cooperation was most actively pursued, with Brazil viewing its relationship with 
China as an opportunity to advance its development agenda and position within the global 
power hierarchy (Christensen, 2012). Furthermore, Brazil‘s leaders hoped that the country 
would be elevated to first-world status as a result of the resource boom and high levels of 
economic growth. However, since the recent downturn in the global commodity markets as a 
result of China‘s slowing economy and the beginning of its ―new normal‖ phase, Brazil‘s 
status elevation remains uncertain.   
As a consequence of the global surge in demand for raw materials, neo-extractivism 
became the cornerstone of growth-oriented development policies in Latin America at the turn 
of the twenty-first century, despite growing evidence of its limited contribution to national 
development. As Brand explains,  
 
Extractivism is not just the activity of resource extraction but a development 
model, which organizes – on the basis of the exploitation and marketing of 
resources for export – the political, socio-economic and cultural relations within 
the respective country or region: the economy and class structures, gender 
relations, the state and public discourse (2013: 3).  
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Furthermore, while extractivism previously referred to activities that involved extracting, such 
as in mining, oil and gas, the term is now often used to refer to the accelerated pace of natural 
resource exploitation at an industrial level and the construction of mega-projects and 
infrastructure intended to make full use of natural resources (UNHRC, 2015). Latin 
America‘s progressive governments have both intensified natural resource extraction and 
created a new type of extractivism that bears a ―progressive stamp‖ (Gudynas, 2010: 3). 
Under the framework of neo-extractivism, regulation of the appropriation of resources and 
export duties and taxes has increased, contracts renegotiated and surplus revenue redirected to 
social programmes such as the state assistance programme for the poor, Bolsa Família. 
However, even under its contemporary guise where the state plays a much more active role, 
neo-extractivism does not substantially change the current structure of accumulation and 
move away from a productivist appropriation of nature. Although it was hoped that the rise of 
the left and centre-left in Latin America would lead to a transition away from extractivist 
activities towards a more sustainable type of development, these governments have in fact 
continued to maintain classic extractivism, albeit with a progressive twist (Gudynas, 2010). 
As Gudynas (2010: 4) notes, the progressive governments of the region have replaced the old 
extractivist discourse that pointed toward exports or the world market with one that points to 
globalization and competition. This change in discourse has been reflected in Brazil, where 
under the Partido dos Trabalhadores government, the country has also radically reoriented its 
agricultural production towards monoculture exports and is rapidly becoming a mining 
powerhouse, opening up new sites and processors. However, the recent slowdown in the 
global economy has underlined the problematic nature of neo-extractivist development 
strategies given changes in global prices and demand, sharpening the social, environmental 
and political problems associated with the model as the structure of Brazil‘s exports 
illustrates. 
Brazil‘s increasing reliance on a small number of agricultural and natural resource 
exports has exposed the country‘s vulnerability to fluctuating global commodity prices and, in 
particular, the changing fortunes of the Chinese economy. Between 2004 and 2011 Brazil‘s 
economic boom was built on the diversification of export products, with a specific emphasis 
on natural resources and manufactured goods. As Table 1 shows, exports to China increased 
exponentially from the mid-2000s, peaking in 2013 and declining after that, reflecting lower 
demand for Brazil‘s exports. Despite the decline in demand, China has continued to serve as 
Brazil‘s largest export destination, followed by the EU, South America and the US. While the 
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volume of Brazilian exports signals the economic significance of trade with China, the nature 
of these exports reveals an asymmetric relationship. The growing importance of China as 
Brazil‘s largest trading partner has coincided with a shift away from manufactured exports 
towards agricultural products and natural resources (Wilkinson and Wesz Junior, 2013: 250). 
Pereira and de Castro Neves (2011: 4) observe that Sino-Brazilian relations have therefore 
come to resemble the classic unequal North-South trading relationship rather than an equal 
partnership between emerging powers as the ―South-South‖ label suggests. To illustrate this 
dynamic, three major export products have dominated Sino-Brazilian trade since the mid-
2000s: soy (32% of the country‘s exports to China in 2015), iron ore (23%) and petroleum 
(14%) (Ministério de Desenvolvimento/SECEX, 2016). Conversely, Brazil‘s imports from 
China have centred primarily on consumer goods such as electronics and cars in addition to 
capital and manufactured goods. Although Brazil continues to be a major industrial producer 
and exporter, this asymmetrical relationship has increased the political significance of the 
agricultural and natural resource sectors compared to industry while also heightening social-
environmental contestation. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministério de Desenvolvimento/Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (2016). 
―Intercâmbio comercial brasileiro: China‖. 
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Each of Brazil‘s major export products has become associated with an array of social, 
environmental and even political problems. Firstly, in 2009 Brazil became the world‘s second 
largest soy exporter after the US, with 56% of soy exports destined for China for that year 
(Nature Conservancy, 2011: 7-9). Soy production has contributed to unsustainable changes in 
land use – a major cause of climate change – resulting from the expansion of soy production, 
often facilitated by Chinese investment (Wilkinson and Wesz Junior, 2013: 255), as well as 
road and storage construction in vulnerable areas. Secondly, Brazil‘s mining production 
quadrupled between 2005 and 2011 before declining again in response to falling global 
demand. In 2014, three-quarters of Brazilian total mining exports consisted of iron ore, a 
sector dominated by the former state-owned company Companhia Vale do Doce (IBRAM, 
2015: 14; IBRAM, 2016: 1). The remote locations of most iron ore operations have 
necessitated road and railroad construction in environmentally sensitive areas to transport the 
goods to the nearest ports. The environmental implications of iron ore mining in Brazil 
became global news in November 2015 when a mining dam burst in the state of Minas 
Gerais, creating one of the country‘s largest environmental disasters. Thirdly, Brazil‘s oil 
exports increased by 36% between 2013 and 2014, with the US as the country‘s largest export 
destination and China its second-largest market (EIA, 2015: 4). Dominated by the part state-
owned company Petrobras, the Brazilian oil sector has become highly politicized as a result of 
the corruption scandal in which many of Brazil‘s prominent politicians have been involved. 
The corruption investigation, titled Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash), has 
contributed to one of the country‘s worst political crises. Consequently, the prominent role of 
these three major export products not only illustrates their economic significance for Brazil 
but also that the country‘s political and environmental fortunes have become intricately linked 
with natural resources.  
Despite the range of social, environmental and economic problems, as well as the left‘s 
critical stance on extractivist enclave economies in the past, neo-extractivism has become ―a 
part of South America‘s own contemporary version of development, which maintains the 
myth of progress under a new hybridization of culture and politics‖ (Gudynas, 2010: 13). 
Engaging with a modernization discourse based on continual progress through scientific and 
technological innovation – particularly with respect to consumption potential – for Latin 
American government‘s neo-extractivism presents an opportunity to bring about long-term 
structural improvements through substantial investment in infrastructure and education 
(Unm  ig, 2012). Yet alongside this model of growth based on extractivism and 
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redistribution, problems traditionally associated with the curse of natural resource 
development remain, such as authoritarianism and disputes over the profits of nature. Acosta 
argues that large-scale natural resource extraction has led to the ―emergence of paternalist 
states, whose influencing capacity is tied to their political capacity to negotiate a greater or 
lesser share of the rents from mining or the oil industry‖ (2013: 75). Moreover, the large 
revenues associated with extraction often unleash high levels of violence and repression in the 
extractive enclaves as multinational companies and governments seek to guarantee the supply 
of natural resources though the opening up of remote frontiers and networks of connectivity. 
The networks that support neo-extractivism are essential to ensuring the continual flow of 
personnel, equipment and in particular energy, and are supported by the Initiative for the 
Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South-America, the latter being set up to ensure 
greater commercial and social integration (Gudynas, 2010; Hochstetler, 2013: 42-3).  
As the concept of neo-extractivism overtakes sustainable development as the new 
leading strategy in political discourse, lingering and persistent problems associated with 
previous agendas prevail. As Brand argues,  
 
The dominant paradigm of economic and social development becomes 
problematic given the impossibility of the business-as-usual scenario and the 
globalization of resource-intensive Western production and consumption patterns. 
Also, the neoclassical argument that prices for products do not reflect the ―true‖ 
environmental costs is often used (2012: 29).  
 
Therefore, while Brazil‘s outward commitment to green energy and sustainable development 
should theoretically mean adhering to its principles of equity, participation and environmental 
valuation, its mega hydroelectric dam projects appear to directly contradict these key 
principles (Bratman, 2015). Moreover, the concept of green economy appears to be – like the 
concept of sustainable development – ―an oxymoron which intends to bundle different, partly 
contradictory, interests and strategies, and gives them a certain legitimacy and coherence‖ 
(Brand, 2012: 29). While a development model based on natural resources and agriculture 
continues to be attractive for Latin American governments, despite falling prices and 
intensifying political problems, Chinese trade and investment have contributed to deepening 
Latin America‘s unsustainable reliance on primary products. 
Having depleted the resources of its Asian neighbours, the Amazon basin has become 
China‘s main supplier of natural materials. According to Ratliff (2012: 217), ―above all, 
China wants to invest in production, domestic transportation, and the international shipment 
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to China of Latin America‘s natural resources and commodities‖; a strategy translated into 
multi-billion dollar investment plans in infrastructure development in Brazil‘s most 
ecologically sensitive regions. Although the Amazonian region has a long history of 
exploration and exploitation dating back to the 1600s, its industrialisation is increasingly 
facing opposition as the world‘s attention concentrates on climate change and the ecological 
crisis. The intensification of raw material extraction and natural elements, including minerals, 
energy carriers, forest and agricultural goods has profound social, environmental and 
territorial consequences for Brazil. The ecological effects include soil depletion, deforestation, 
decline in biodiversity and freshwater contamination. Moreover, the strengthening of 
Brazilian agribusiness has impacted profoundly on domestic politics and resulted in the 
weakening of environmental regulation, policies and safeguards (Hochstetler, 2013: 42; Ray 
et al., 2015). While the expropriation of extensive lands from local communities for activities 
such as mining, timber extraction, infrastructure projects and agricultural production has 
always been associated with the industrialisation of the Amazon, Chinese investment and 
finance in these areas has created new opportunities for further expropriation.  
 
Brazil and China‘s relationship is not only constructed on economic interests but also 
represents a concrete expression of South-South development cooperation, although this 
relationship is not without its difficulties, particularly when it comes to their asymmetrical 
trading relationship. In particular, the Brazilian government has focused its efforts on 
attracting Chinese capital for large-scale investment in infrastructural projects such as ports, 
airports, highways, railways and energy as well as oil exploration. China has become one of 
the largest exporters of capital over the last two decades. Cordeiro Pires (2015) argues that 
Chinese investments are based on two rationales: firstly, to guarantee the continuous supply 
of raw materials and food needed to sustain the country‘s economic growth; and secondly, to 
promote business opportunities for Chinese companies that produce durable consumer goods, 
are involved in information and technology or provide energy. Generally, Chinese 
investments in raw materials and food tend to be in developing countries while efforts to 
promote Chinese companies focus on developed countries where China is not only looking 
for access to markets but also ―an environment that favors the development of research and 
technical innovation centers‖ (Cordeiro Pires, 2015: 253; Ratliff, 2012). With Brazil‘s vast 
natural resources, including agricultural land, raw materials, and hydroelectric capacity, as 
well as its ability to offer China a manufacturing base to supply national and regional markets 
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particularly given the extraction and production of commodities (Cordeiro Pires, 2015; 
Fearnside and Figueiredo, 2015), China‘s increasing interest in Brazil is unsurprising. These 
shared interests now include climate change, energy security and renewable energy, which 
explains China‘s motivation to invest in renewable energy projects in Latin America.  
 
Climate Change and Environmental Cooperation between Brazil and China 
The announcement of the Ten-Year Action Plan for Cooperation in 2012 by President Dilma 
Rousseff and President Wen Jiabao strengthened their political ties, thereby deepening 
bilateral relations and cooperation between China and Brazil. Since 2012, the strategic 
partnership between the two countries has ―evolved towards the ―global‖ level‖ and Sino-
Brazilian relations have made considerable progress in the areas of politics, trade and science 
and technology (Cordeiro Pires, 2015: 243). International political cooperation between China 
and Brazil has focused on shared objectives such as strengthening the global power of 
developing countries in multilateral institutions and emerging powers‘ right to pursue 
economic development (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012: 906-8). In fact, their relationship is not 
purely economic but also has political and geo-strategic dimensions (Altemani de Oliveira, 
2010; Cardoso, 2012: 40), based on a shared desire to enhance the global economic position 
of major developing countries and their role in multilateral institutions. For Brazil, 
strengthening the position of developing countries within multilateral institutions continues to 
be an important foreign policy principle (Guilhon Albuquerque, 2003: 268). Particularly 
during the Lula governments (2003-2009), but less so during the Dilma Rousseff 
administrations (2010 onwards), Brazil has focused on building South-South relations through 
‗multilateralism, bilateral relations, and informal mechanisms of cooperation‘ (Almeida, 
2009: 175). Similarly, for China a core foreign policy goal involves ‗promoting South-South 
cooperation, bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring 
a bigger say and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in international 
trade and financial affairs‘ (Hu cited in Ratliff, 2012: 216; Cheng, 2006: 505, 510). In terms 
of the international environmental and climate change agenda, both countries have also begun 
to coordinate their position in international climate change talks, particularly since 2009.  
As two of the world‘s leading emerging powers, Brazil and China are now coordinating 
their moves in the international arena through forums such as the G20, G77, BRICS and the 
BASIC (Brazil, India, South Africa and China) group. As Cordeiro Pires comments, with 
China now the world‘s largest producer of greenhouse gases, ―China, the ―grey giant,‖ when 
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standing next to Brazilian the ―green giant,‖ has greater leverage compared to when standing 
alone‖ (2015: 246). Both countries have therefore become major players in international 
climate change talks as emerging powers; however this is also a recognition of their 
vulnerability to climate change and environmental disasters such as droughts, floods, 
deforestation, landslides and pollution. They not only share concerns about climate change 
vulnerability, their policies are also driven by energy security requirements and the need to 
reconcile environmental policy with economic development priorities. Since COP15 in 
Copenhagen in 2009, the major developing countries have increasingly coordinated their 
position in international climate change negotiations through the BASIC group (Harris, 2011: 
11), initially rejecting binding carbon emissions targets for the emerging powers to a greater 
(India and China) or lesser (Brazil and South Africa) extent (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 2014). 
Since 2009 both Brazil and China have gradually shifted their position towards a greater 
acceptance of the responsibility of major developing countries for carbon emissions, leading 
to voluntary commitments in the run-up to COP21 to cut carbon emissions by 2025 and 2030, 
as expressed in bilateral agreements with the US (White House, 2015a, 2015b) and their 
Intended Nationally Determined Commitments (INDCs) submitted ahead of the negotiations. 
Up to the mid-2000s, Brazil‘s perspective on international environmental policy also 
emphasised the national interest, defined as the right to economic development, including the 
exploitation of natural resources. This view translated into an emphasis on national 
sovereignty over natural resources and on developing countries‘ common but differentiated 
responsibilities regarding the climate change agenda. In recent decades this perspective has 
shifted, particularly following the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Brazil‘s involvement in 
developing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the 1990s signalled a commitment 
to climate change mitigation, thereby explaining the country‘s focus on supporting financial 
and technical compensation for climate change policies and adaptation in developing 
countries (Johnson, 2001: 182). In 2009 the Brazilian government committed itself to a 
unilateral and voluntary reduction of carbon emissions and began shifting its position in 
climate change talks away from the traditional emphasis on developing countries‘ 
differentiated responsibilities. The country has also made significant progress in combating 
deforestation and has become a model for renewable energy use in the National Climate 
Change Plan, all of which have informed Brazil‘s decision to shift to a more proactive 
commitment to global environmental action in order to develop a leadership role in this area 
(Riethof, 2016a). In recent international climate change talks – for example Copenhagen, 
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Durban and Paris – Brazil has demonstrated more flexibility concerning the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle while continuing to resist calls to add major 
developing countries to Annex 1. These strategies reflect the country‘s ambition to take a 
leading role in global climate change policy and to serve as a model of green development 
and renewable energy in the developing world. 
 
In China‘s case the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities has also driven the 
government‘s national and international climate change policy. While accepting the 
multilateral climate change framework of the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change), China has consistently rejected binding emissions targets for developing 
countries, insisting on the principle that developed countries should bear primary 
responsibility due to their historic contribution to climate change (Harris, 2011: 2). Similar to 
Brazil, China‘s economic development priorities, including energy security, appear to 
override concerns about sustainability and climate change (Ibid.: 8-10). However, China‘s 
position as a major contributor to carbon emissions and concerns about growing domestic 
consumption levels has increased international pressure on the country to address climate 
change (Rong, 2010: 4583-4). This international pressure and the country‘s vulnerability to 
the negative effects of climate change have resulted in voluntary commitments to carbon 
emissions reductions and a bilateral climate change agreement with the US in the run-up to 
COP21 in 2015 (Jayaram, 2015: 223). Moreover, according to Moore (2011: 149, 152), 
development and environmental priorities do not automatically clash, as ―China‘s policy on 
climate change is best understood as a collection of policies calculated to pursue other 
interests, but which have co-benefits for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions‖. Jayaram 
(2015: 225) argues that the area where China has made most progress is renewable energy, 
which Moore (2011: 152-3) explains as resulting from Chinese concerns about energy 
security and the country‘s dependence on energy imports. Consequently, ―the key point about 
China‘s policies to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy, usually seen as part of 
its climate change policy, is that they accomplish broader [development and security] goals‖ 
(Moore, 2011: 153). For China the responsibility of developed countries for climate change 
also translates into the latter‘s obligation to provide technical and financial support for 
developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Balme, 2011: 49). This 
combined commitment to renewable energy and energy security helps explain China‘s drive 
to invest in hydro-electric power generation in Brazil. 
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Sino-Brazilian Relations and the Struggle for Renewable Energy: The Case of 
Hydropower 
Renewable energy has become increasingly important as world leaders seek to reduce the rate 
of climate change whilst simultaneously increasing energy supplies through the use of 
renewable natural resources. Since the energy shortages in 2001, Brazil has shown a renewed 
interest in energy-generation and in the search for additional and diversified energy sources. 
This energy deficiency provided the Brazilian government with ―a window of opportunity to 
pursue energy development projects despite their environmental and social costs‖ (Carvalho, 
2006: 248). Furthermore, increasing domestic oil production and mining as well as Brazil‘s 
expanding agricultural sector have placed growing pressure on energy resources as demand 
outstrips capacity. The extractive boom and prioritisation of mining, hydrocarbons and soy 
production in Brazil has also contributed to the speeding up of energy infrastructure projects. 
In 2014, Brazil was the eighth-largest consumer of energy in the world, with total primary 
energy consumption almost doubling in the last decade because of its sustained economic 
growth (EIA, 2015). The high proportion of renewable energy use in Brazil has also allowed 
the government to argue that the country can meet its climate change commitments by 
increasing renewable energy use alongside reducing deforestation. 
Under the Clean Development Mechanism, Brazil has become one of the main 
destinations for funds to build large hydroelectric dams to deliver renewable energy with low 
greenhouse gas emissions. Designed to assist developing countries achieve sustainable 
development while enabling developed countries to achieve their emissions reduction targets 
set under the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil has embraced CDM as a means of pursuing its energy-
generation plans while maintaining its international commitment to reduce global carbon 
emissions. Although the Amazon River has been considered as a potential source to generate 
energy since the late 1960s, under the banner of green energy, the Brazilian government has 
expanded considerably its plans for hydroelectric dams as its tries to meet its rapidly rising 
energy demands. Brazil‘s 2011-2020 energy expansion plan called for 48 additional large 
dams to be built in the next decade, 30 of which would be in the legal Amazon region. This 
would be the equivalent of an average rate of one dam every four months (Fearnside, 2012). 
While Brazil‘s hydropower potential is the third largest in the world behind China and Russia, 
the relatively flat Brazilian Amazon is less suited to hydropower given that this form of 
energy production requires an elevation gradient. Therefore, the hydroelectric plants will 
require large and shallow reserves (Finer and Jenkins, 2012). The large distances between the 
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main producers and consumers – the wealthier states in the southeast of Brazil – have meant 
that the expansion of renewable energy production also requires the construction of 
transmission networks, affecting local communities and the environment. 
As a result of Brazil‘s potential for hydropower expansion, a key aspect of Brazil‘s 
development policy involves reducing its dependence on energy imports and utilising its 
untapped hydropower of around 180,000MW. In order to satisfy demand, Brazil needs to add 
around 6,000MW each year for the next decade to its installed generating capacity of 
121,000MW (Economist, 2013). Carvalho argues that despite the environmental and social 
costs associated with hydroelectric dams and Brazil‘s tumultuous political context, large-scale 
energy development continues to dominate the policy process because of the potential gains, 
both economic and strategic, associated with energy development as well as Brazil‘s 
patrimonial politics that ―affords the dominant coalitions much better access to key decision 
makers and resources (financial and personnel)‖ and allows them to pursue agendas over long 
periods of time (2011: 247). In addition to these factors, the emergence of the green energy 
model has provided Brazil with a legitimate means of pursuing its energy-generation plans by 
incorporating, under the guise of green energy, its hydropower potential into its development 
strategy. Moreover, this pursuit for ―green energy‖ has been supported on a global level by 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank which has significantly increased its funding 
for dam construction and now considers hydroelectric energy to be a critical part of its clean 
energy matrix (Bratman, 2015) Yet, the green economy, the current global economic model 
developed in response to the tensions between environmental protection and economic 
development, remains based on raw extraction (Gudynas, 2010). Furthermore, the green 
economy has provided another way to turn nature into a source of profit by creating a new 
market for green technologies, goods and services.  
It is within this discourse of clean energy strategies that Brazil has positioned itself as a 
global leader in hydroelectric energy, with the increasingly important role of Chinese 
investment in infrastructure, production and technology. Although there are no 
comprehensive statistics available detailing Chinese investments in Brazil (Ratliff, 2012: 
217), the available information indicates that it has become China‘s second-largest investment 
destination in Latin America after Venezuela since the mid-2000s. The bulk of Chinese 
investment in Latin America has targeted the energy sector – particularly the oil industry but 
also renewables – and infrastructure, such as roads, railroads and ports (Gallagher and Myers, 
2014). In 2012, 60% (US$ 2.6 billion) out of a total of US$ 4.3 billion worth of Chinese 
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investments in Brazil was destined for the energy sector, including renewable energy and oil. 
In the same year, the Chinese company State Grid invested US$492 million in electricity 
transmission networks to link the large Amazonian hydro-electric dams to the national grid. 
As part of an international consortium State Grid also bid successfully to construct 
transmission lines for the Teles Pires hydro-electric complex in the states of Pará and Mato 
Grosso, with the consortium now controlling ―the rights to more than 10,000 kilometers of 
transmission lines in the country‖ (Cote, 2014: 19). Chinese investment was not restricted to 
hydro-power as Astroenergy invested US$350 million in solar energy production in the 
northeastern state of Ceará (CBEC, 2014: 10-14). In 2013 China‘s investment in the energy 
sector comprised 43.9% of total investment, centring on oil and electric energy (Ibid.: 14). 
The China National Petroleum Corporation and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
bid as part of an international consortium for the exploitation of the pre-salt Libra oil field in 
October 2013. Echoing the June 2013 mass demonstrations in major Brazilian cities, the Libra 
auction sparked protests in Rio de Janeiro organised by trade unions and social movements as 
well as legal challenges to the selling off of the country‘s oil reserves (Braathen, 2015).  
Even though oil is more important than electricity for bilateral trade, financial and 
technological investment in Brazil‘s renewables sector matches China‘s own energy policy, 
which has focused on reducing dependency on energy imports while diversifying energy 
sources (Koch-Weser, 2015: 26). Chinese demand for electricity-intensive materials such as 
aluminium are contributing to this surge in demand for electricity and are also a key driver 
behind Brazil‘s hydroelectric expansion plans in Amazonia. The severe droughts that Brazil 
suffered in 2014 and 2015 have also highlighted the vulnerability of the renewable energy 
sector to climate change, underscoring the need for further investment in dams and 
transmission networks. For these reasons, and despite the global economic downturn, Chinese 
investment in Latin America increased substantially in 2015, with investments in Brazil in oil, 
soy processing, infrastructure and hydropower (Myers, Gallagher and Yuan, 2016: 2). In 
2015, following a visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang to Brazil, China Three 
Gorges Corporation bought two hydroelectric plants in Brazil as part of a US$ 53 billion 
investment package. These initiatives will likely lead to continued Chinese funding for 
Brazil‘s renewable energy projects, one of the most controversial aspects of the country‘s 
development agenda as evident from the large number of conflicts around hydro-electric 
power generation. While hydropower is widely accepted as a cleaner source of energy than 
fossil fuels, it comes at the cost of endangering biodiversity and indigenous livelihoods. 
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Renewable energy promises benefits such as a sustained supply of energy for economic and 
social development as well as reducing dependence on energy imports and fossil fuels. 
Chinese investment in the renewable energy sector in Brazil has increased in recent years, 
reflecting both countries‘ shared interest in enhancing their energy security by diversifying 
energy sources. However, dam construction projects are fraught with conflicts about their 
social environmental sustainability, as expressed in the domestic and international protests 
against dams such as Belo Monte, Rio Madeira, Teles Pires and São Luiz do Tapajós in the 
Amazonian region. Following President Lula da Silva‘s announcement of the Growth 
Acceleration Programme in 2007, the Rio Madeira Complex was listed as a high priority 
infrastructural project. Despite the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable 
Natural Resources (IBAMA) originally opposing the approval of the preliminary license, the 
Madeira dam project was later agreed after the Ministry of the Environment caved under 
presidential pressure. As a sign of the government‘s displeasure at opposition to its 
hydroelectric dam projects, the head of the licensing department was immediately replaced 
and the IBAMA divided into two agencies, essentially paralysing many of its activities 
(Fearnside, 2014). Worryingly, this highlights how susceptible the system is to political 
pressure and has led to a number of precedents that fundamentally weaken the safeguard 
process for future dams.  
 
Despite questions about consultation procedures and the social and environmental 
sustainability of large dam projects, the Brazilian government has highlighted the Rio 
Madeira hydro-electric complex in the state of Mato Grosso and the Belo Monte and São Luiz 
do Tapajós dams in the state of Pará as a cornerstone of Brazil‘s economic strategy since 2007 
(Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015: 84-88). After years of delays and under political 
pressure, the licensing for hydroelectric dams has been accelerated despite significant 
opposition. The Belo Monte Dam was finally approved by Congress and the Senate in July 
2005 but challenges to the project‘s legality continue, as human rights violations and lacking 
consultation procedures have provoked significant protests by a wide-ranging domestic and 
international coalition of indigenous communities, the national Movimento dos Atingidos por 
Barragens (MAB, or Movement of People Affected by Dams), socio-environmentalist and 
human organisations (Fearnside, 2006: 20-23; Instituto Socioambiental, undated). Critics of 
hydro-electric dams, such as the NGO Instituto Socioambiental, have pointed out that the 
project is a prelude to further dam construction in the region, spreading the impact to other 
Malayna Raftopoulos & Marieke Riethof  JCIR Special Issue (2016) 
 
168 
 
communities living in the area (Instituto Socioambiental, 2015; Fearnside 2006). At the same 
time, the construction process has created a frontier culture in the region, with people moving 
to the nearby city of Altamira in the hope of obtaining construction and related jobs. 
According to Assis da Costa Oliveira (2015: 140-1), the construction process has created an 
increasingly explosive social situation with rising incidences of sexual harassment, violence, 
homicide and human trafficking. Due to the dam‘s impact on river levels, local communities 
have experienced more extreme water level fluctuations than usual as well as flooding, 
leading to displacement and the destruction of livelihoods. These effects indicate that dam 
construction is likely to have longer-term, and possibly irreversible, implications for the 
region which have not been resolved by mitigation strategies proposed by the government and 
the construction consortiums. 
Apart from the direct and indirect effects of dam construction on local communities and 
the environment, measures to mitigate and compensate for these impacts also appear to have 
failed to address the concerns of those affected by dams. These issues underline the anti-dam 
coalition‘s argument that their substantive concerns have not been addressed or resolved as a 
result of inadequate consultation processes (Riethof, 2016b; Instituto Socioambiental, 2015: 
48-53). According to the MAB although the dam had started operating in 2016 several local – 
in many cases forcibly displaced – communities still had no access to a functioning sewerage 
system while indigenous rights continued to be violated (MAB, 2016a). A 2015 report by the 
NGO Instituto Socioambiental details the local impacts of the Belo Monte dam, focusing in 
particular on the effects of displacement, pressure on public services provision, and safety 
concerns among urban and rural communities (Instituto Socioambiental, 2015). The report 
demonstrates that some of the promised improvements funded by the Norte Energia 
consortium which owns the dam project have not delivered the desired outcomes. In the case 
of indigenous communities, a significant proportion of the investment to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the dam was spent purchasing boats, engines and petrol, leading the report to 
conclude that this money had created clientelistic relations between the consortium and the 
communities. The report also found increased consumption of processed foods while child 
malnutrition had risen by 127% between 2010 and 2012 (Ibid., 2015: 19, 21). Members of 
local fishing communities mentioned how during the construction process explosions, 
chemicals as well as the physical destruction of nature affected the fish stocks. Their forced 
displacement meant that these communities no longer had access to their traditional fishing 
grounds without having access to alternative livelihoods (Ibid., 2015: 18). Local groups, 
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particularly women‘s movements in Amazonia, have also protested in urban areas such as 
Altamira and Belém against the rising cost of electricity (MAB, 2016b), indicating that hydro-
power expansion has focused on powering development in wealthier parts of Brazil rather 
than increasing local access to electric power.  
The Belo Monte protests led by indigenous and other local communities, 
environmentalists, labour and human rights activists have not been targeted exclusively at 
Chinese involvement but more generally at the neglect of the affected communities‘ rights, 
including appropriate compensation and consultation. However, in 2015 and in the midst of 
protests and debates about whether the Belo Monte Dam should receive an operating license 
given the violations of indigenous rights (Instituto Socioambiental, 2015), State Grid won a 
contract to construct and maintain a transmission line connecting the dam to the national grid 
(Xinhua, 2015). The company‘s involvement in Belo Monte became controversial when the 
construction consortium attempted to negotiate a partial authorisation to start construction in 
early 2015, before the dam‘s operating license had been approved. The Brazilian media also 
reported that the company intended to hire 10,000 Chinese workers, which would not have 
been permissible according to Brazilian labour legislation (Borges, 2015). The Belo Monte 
case illustrates the uneven impact of dam construction, framed in government discourses as 
producing development for Brazil as a whole. Mirroring Latin American debates about neo-
extractivism‘s generalised benefits versus the local costs, we can find a similar dynamic in 
struggles against hydroelectric dams, with the added dimension of dams producing renewable 
energy. Whereas local communities have often suffered the negative effects, they have not 
necessarily benefited or received adequate compensation for their losses.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored how economic and political relations between Brazil and China have 
shaped the distribution of the positive and negative impacts of Brazil‘s recent commodity 
boom. The environmental dimensions of Sino-Brazilian relations have been little studied thus 
far, and when they have they have generally focused on the environmental effects of soy trade 
and road construction, such as deforestation, transport and land use changes. With the bulk of 
Chinese investment now destined for the energy sector – both fossil fuels and renewables – 
this article argues that the social and environmental effects of the asymmetrical relationship 
between Brazil and China is not only found in the export and infrastructure sectors but also 
increasingly in renewable energy projects. The latter, particularly hydro-electric power, has 
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supported China and Brazil‘s search for alternative energy sources and their efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions associated with the export sector. However, large dam projects and linked 
construction processes, such as transmission networks and facilities for workers, have 
infringed on the rights of the local population. As a result of dam projects, local communities 
have faced problems such as flooding, pollution, land invasions and the influx of large 
numbers of people attracted by the dams‘ employment prospects. Meanwhile, reports on 
projects such as Belo Monte (Instituto Socioambiental, 2015) have detailed how basic 
services such as health, sanitation, education and energy for the affected communities 
continue to fall short of the wider benefits of hydropower for the Brazilian economy. The 
conflicts and controversies surrounding hydro-electric dams therefore illustrate the 
paradoxical relationship between environmental protection, the expansion of renewable 
energy, and the socio-economic development agenda in Latin America. 
Although the expansion of hydroelectric power has been based on the exploitation of 
the supposedly renewable natural resource of water rather than the extraction of minerals and 
hydrocarbons, the construction and operation of hydroelectric dams has become associated 
with irreversible damage to the environment and communities living in the vicinity of the 
megadams. The debate on the sustainability of Latin America‘s neo-extractivist model is 
therefore highly relevant to the debates about the renewable energy sector. Under Latin 
America‘s progressive governments, neo-extractivist development strategies, reinforced by 
the global commodity boom lasting up to the late 2000s, allowed politicians to argue that 
there was a trade-off between the wider benefits of natural resource revenues, often reinvested 
in social programmes, and the localised interests of affected communities. In addition, 
together with the reduction of deforestation rates in Brazil, the expansion of hydropower has 
also supported Brazil‘s climate change agenda, juxtaposing the arguments about the 
environmental benefits and damage caused by the dams. Despite the politicisation of natural 
resources and Brazil‘s prominent position in international climate change debates, the 
country‘s economy remains highly reliant on nature and the exploitation of natural resources 
as the trends in trade and investment with China demonstrate. While the socio-environmental 
controversies surrounding Brazil‘s energy sector cannot be attributed solely to the intensifying 
political and economic connections with China, this relationship has reinforced the 
unsustainable dimensions of Brazil‘s export boom as well as the uneven distribution of its 
costs and benefits. 
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